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Increasing risk does not ordinarily result in tort liability. For
instance, every speeding driver increases the risk of a traffic acci-
dent.' Tort liability, however, attaches only if the driver actually
causes an accident, This means that of two reckless drivers who en-
gage in exactly the same risky behavior, one might face great liability,
while the other might escape with no liability at all. The difference
between the two cases is in many ways a mere fortuity-whether tim-
ing and circumstance conspire to cause a traffic accident in a particu-
lar case or not. Many acts of reckless driving go unanswered in tort
under this system. We accept this result in the case of the reckless
driver, partly because the chance of an accident will probably deter
potential defendants from engaging in risky behavior. Moreover, if no
accident occurs, there is no plaintiff to compensate.
The typical case involving human exposure to toxic substances,
however, presents an entirely different set of concerns. Injuries often
remain latent for many years, creating procedural and evidentiary
barriers to tort recovery.2 Inherent difficulties in proving causation
form an additional barrier. 3 As a result, actual injuries may not re-
sult in appropriate tort liability. This calls into question current tort
law's ability to deter behavior that results in human exposure to toxic
substances. Moreover, when the reckless driver parks her car, the
risk is over. We know at that point whether any injuries have oc-
curred. People exposed to toxic substances, however, remain at in-
creased risk for contracting a disease long after the risk-creating ac-
tivity has ceased.4
Tort law has not effectively addressed the unique problems
presented by toxic exposure cases. These cases challenge traditional
tort principles in ways reminiscent of some of the most vexing tort
problems courts have faced in the twentieth century-wrongful life
cases, 5 DES litigation,6 and loss of chance cases. 7 As in those situ-
ations, toxic tort cases call for special rules. To ensure clarity, uni-
1. The speeding motorist is a common example used to illustrate the proposition that
there is no tort liability for increasing risks. See, for example, Christopher H. Schroeder,
Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 439, 440 (1990).
2. See notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
3. See notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
4. Bartin C. Legum, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 563,
565-66 (1984).
5. See notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
6. See notes 202-06 and accompanying text. DES litigation refers to the controversy
surrounding diethylstilbestrol.
7. See notes 207-23 and accompanying text.
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formity and fair application, these special rules should be developed
and implemented by state legislatures. 8 Specifically, causes of action
based on increased risk-medical monitoring, fear of future disease,
and outright recovery for increased risk9-should be recognized at
law.
A. Background Information on Toxic Substances
In the years since World War II, American industries have be-
come increasingly dependent on organic chemical technology, 10 par-
ticularly chlorinated compounds., These years have also seen
marked increases in American cancer and birth defect rates.12
Current science is unable to draw a connection between the two phe-
nomena with absolute certainty.' 3 An ample amount of disturbing
evidence exists, however, to show that chlorinated compounds do pose
significant human health risks. 14
Chlorine-based substances include some of the most notorious
environmental threats-chloroflorocarbons ("CFCs"), 15 polychlorinated
8. See Part IV.
9. To clarify any confusion that might result from the use of the term "increased risk" to
refer both to the underlying premise of all three claims and to one particular cause of action, it
should be noted that the increased risk cause of action focuses on the main injury. Fear of fu-
ture disease and medical monitoring claims constitute additional causes of action that might be
brought independently, but that are ultimately premised on the existence of the increased risk
injury.
10. See generally Joan A. Ferretti, Looking for the Big Pictura Developing a
Jurisprudence for a Biotechnological Age, 10 Pace Envir. L. Rev. 711 (1993). Organic chemical
research began during the war as industries attempted to find substitutes for rubber,
pharmaceuticals, and aviation materials. Id. at 712-13. After the war, these new technologies
were converted to peacetime uses. Id. at 713.
11. Bette Hileman, Concerns Broaden Over Chlorine and Chlorinated Hydrocarbons,
Chem. & Eng. News 11 (Apr. 19, 1993). The analysis in this Note also applies to substances
other than chlorinated compounds that might cause harmful health effects.
12. Id. at 13. A senior scientist at the National Research Council has reported "increases
in cancer that cannot be explained solely in terms of aging, changes in coding [for individual
diseases], or access to care." Id. In addition to increases in cancer, sperm counts in men have
fallen 42% since 1940. Certain chlorinated compounds may also have an effect on birth defect
rates and on the immune, neurological, and endocrine systems of exposed fetuses. Id. at 14-15.
13. The two main ways of assessing whether a substance has harmful effects are animal
testing and epidemiology. See generally Carl F. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances: A
Philosophy of Science and the Law 29-40 (Oxford U., 1993).
14. See Hileman, Chem. & Eng. News at 13-16 (cited in note 11) (collecting and discussing
data on the health effects of chlorinated compounds).
15. CFCs are primarily used in aerosol cans and in refrigeration systems. Under the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (Protocor), they must be
phased out. The Environmental Protection Agency CEPA") issued a rule to implement the
Protocol under the Clean Air Act. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 53 Fed. Reg. 30566 (1988).
In 1978, the EPA prohibited almost all propellant uses of CFCs under the Toxic Substance
Control Act. 40 C.F.R. 763.
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biphenyls ("PCBs"),16 chlordane, 17 dioxin,18 and trichloroethylene
("TCE").19 A number of chlorinated compounds have been classified as
probable carcinogens by the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"). 20 Animal tests21 and epidemiological studies22 have in many
cases demonstrated that chlorinated compounds pose a threat to hu-
man health.23 At the very least, these compounds present risky un-
knowns. Given this risk, we must ensure that companies exercise due
16. PCBs are a range of 209 compounds, generally taking the form of a heavy liquid, that
are not water solids and conduct heat but not electricity. Eric Coppolino, Pandora's Poison,
Sierra Mag. 43 (Sept./Oct. 1994). They have been employed in a variety of ways, but their
primary use is as insulation in electrical transformers and capacitors. Id. Since the 1930s, it
has been known that PCBs might produce adverse health effects in humans. Id. However, they
remained unregulated until Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act in 1976. 15
U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1994 ed.). It is now illegal to produce PCBs for commercial use. The Toxic
Substances Control Act provides: "[E]ffective one year after January 1, 1977, no person may
manufacture, process or distribute in commerce or use any polychlorinated biphenyl in any
manner other than in a totally enclosed manner." Id.
17. Chlordane is an insecticide used by extermination companies. The EPA has issued a
registration suspension notice for all food crop and home and garden uses of chlordane. Id. The
chemical may still be used for termite control. See generally Marshall Sittig, Handbook of Toxic
and Hazardous Chemicals and Carcinogens (Noyes, 3rd ed. 1991).
18. Dioxin is produced as a contaminant in certain industrial processes like bleaching pulp
to make paper. Sharon Begley, Don't Drink the Dioxin, Time 57 (Sept. 19, 1994). After dioxin
was spread over the streets of Times Beach, Missouri in an attempt to control dust, the federal
government ordered the town evacuated. Id. Dioxin is also the chemical at issue in the Agent
Orange controversy. See generally Liane Clorfene Casten, The Dioxin File: Anatomy of a
Coverup, The Nation 658 (Sept. 30, 1992).
19. TCE is the chemical most often detected at Superfund sites and is used primarily in
metal cleaning. Philip H. Abelson, Volatile Contaminants of Drinking Water, Science 141 (Jan.
12, 1990). Its properties make it particularly inclined to contaminate groundwater. Id.
20. See, for example, the substances listed as potential carcinogens in the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(including chlordane, PCBs, TCE, and vinyl chloride).
21. Animal testing involves exposing laboratory animals to a maximum tolerated dose of
the substance (a dose as high as possible without causing them to die from non-carcinogenic
effects). Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances at 17 (cited in note 13). Mathematical models are
then used to extrapolate the level of toxicity for humans. Id. Testing in this manner has been
criticized both for problems associated with making a simple linear calculation in this manner,
and because a substance may not have the same effects on different species. See, for example,
Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 44-46 (Harvard
U., 1993).
22. Epidemiology essentially uses statistical models to compare the rate of disease in an
exposed population with the rate of disease in an unexposed population. See generally Bert
Black and David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 Fordham L.
Rev. 732 (1964).
23. Chlorinated compounds have not always been found to be strongly carcinogenic in
animals. Hileman, Chem. & Eng. News at 15 (cited in note 11). Epidemiological analysis,
however, has drawn a link between the compounds and a "cancer epidemic in the industrialized
world." Id. at 16. Animal testing and data from exposed wildlife have shown that the
compounds can have adverse effects on the endocrine, nervous, and immune systems of exposed
fetuses. Id. at 14-15. The data on dioxin is particularly strong, partly because an industrial
accident in 1976 gave scientists a good database for epidemiological study. Marguerite
Holloway, Dioxin Indictment. A Growing Body of Research Links the Compound to Cancer,
Scientific American 25 (Jan. 1994).
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care when using or producing these and other potentially toxic sub-
stances.
B. The Need for Tort Law as a Supplement to Environmental
Regulation
Regulation encourages a company to exercise appropriate lev-
els of care. An efficient and reliable tort system, however, is equally
important. Indeed, without potential tort liability, profit driven enti-
ties may find it cost-effective to engage in behaviors that pose unrea-
sonable threats to human society. For instance, in late 1979, the
Union Carbide Corporation made a crucial decision to begin producing
methyl isocynate ("MIC"), a chlorinated substance, at its pesticide
plant in Bhopal, India.24 The plant, located in a residential neighbor-
hood,25 was in no way equipped to store safely the large amounts of
the chemical that would be produced.26 Union Carbide made no effort
to update the plant facilities, provide adequate training to employees,
develop emergency plans, or inform the public about possible risks.27
Around midnight on December 2, 1984, water somehow infiltrated an
MIC storage tank,28 causing an explosion that killed or seriously in-
jured thousands of people.29 The Bhopal community continues to suf-
fer long-term health effects from this disaster.3 0
24. See generally Jamie Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons from Bhopal (U.
Toronto, 1993).
25. The plant was less than two kilometers away from the center of the city. Id. at 15.
Most of the plant was surrounded by densely populated slums, with no buffer zone or greenbelt.
Id.
26. The plant had been using MIC to formulate pesticides for years. Id. at 13-14.
Manufacturing MIC, however, required the ability to store large amounts of the chemical. Id. at
14. A former Union Carbide employee who was initially in charge of the project claims to have
warned the company of the dangers, but was overridden by the parent company. Id.
27. Id. at 13-18. Many lives could have been saved in the ensuing disaster if people had
known to run against the wind, or place a wet towel over their faces. Id. at 16.
28. Union Carbide claimed the plant has been sabotaged. Id. at 8. The Indian govern-
ment ascribed the accident to a mishandling of the pipe cleaning system, which caused water to
build up high enough in the pipes to wash back through to the MIC tank. Id. at 8-9.
29. It is impossible to know the exact number of victims. Id. at 5. Several thousand were
killed instantly, and thirty to forty thousand are estimated to have been seriously injured. Id.
Many more suffered minor injuries, economic loss, or the loss of family members and friends.
Id.
30. Id. Among the long term health effects reported are vertigo, fatigue, pain, respiratory
problems, vision problems, and coughing up blood. Id. There have been unusually high rates of
stillbirths, spontaneous abortions, birth defects, and infant mortality in the community. Id. at
5-6. Other long term health effects are still being studied. Id. at 6.
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Union Carbide eventually settled litigation over the incident
for $470 million3 -much less than the $3 billion originally sought,
less than an offer Union Carbide had earlier extended,32 and hardly
proportionate to the magnitude of the accident33 The $470 million
settlement was widely perceived as a Union Carbide victory. In fact,
on the day the settlement was announced, Union Carbide's stock
prices rose by two dollars a share.34
Meanwhile, in the United States, Union Carbide built a simi-
lar plant in Institute, West Virginia.35 Like the Bhopal plant, the
West Virginia plant produced MIC. Unlike the Bhopal plant, how-
ever, the West Virginia plant contained computerized warning sys-
tems, equipment designed for higher capacities, and emergency
evacuation plans.36 Even so, the plant was underdesigned for safety.3 7
It experienced a series of gas leaks, the most serious of which oc-
curred only eight months after the Bhopal incident, and injured over
one hundred people.38  The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration ("OSHA") subsequently found the plant in violation of
hundreds of safety regulations.39
In both Bhopal, India and West Virginia, potential liability
failed to provide incentives for Union Carbide to take appropriate
safety steps to prevent mass disaster. Not so coincidentally, India's
tort system is underdeveloped and under-utilized.4 There are no civil
juries, contingency fee arrangements are not allowed, and little tort
doctrine has evolved.41 In addition, litigants must pay prohibitively
high fees to access the courts. 42 As a result, even mass torts such as
the Union Carbide disaster in India may have few legal conse-
31. Id. at 228. As of 1992, none of the victims had actually received final compensation.
Id. at 289.
32. Id. at 223-24.
33. Id. at 223. The settlement vastly underestimated the number of victims and the ade-
quacy of the awards to the known victims has also been questioned. Id. at 228-32.
34. Id. at 223.
35. Id. at 18-19.
36. Id. at 19.
37. Id. at 18.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See generally Marc Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India
After the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 Texas Intl. L. J. 273 (1985).
41. Id. at 275-78. Other factors contributing to lack of tort accountability in India include
the burden placed on the client to conduct factual investigation instead of the lawyer, the lack of
a respectable way for lawyers actively to recruit clients, and a general lack of tort consciousness
among the public. Id.
42. Id. at 274. British colonial rules imposed this requirement through the Indian Courts
Fees Act of 1870 specifically to restrain litigation. Id.
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quences.43  Lack of effective tort accountability in India surely influ-
enced Union Carbide's decision to manufacture MIC at an inappropri-
ate site, virtually ignoring the very real risks associated with its ac-
tions.44
American tort law is more potent than India's, but has none-
theless failed to address the special challenges posed by chemical
accident and toxic tort litigation.45 Lack of full tort accountability is
less extreme than in India, but the American tort system has also
proved unable to ensure responsible safety decisions. Although the
safety decisions made for the American plant were somewhat better
than those made in India, the hundreds of OSHA violations suggest
that safety measures were still not completely satisfactory.46
Union Carbide may be an unusually egregious example, but
potential liability can have a substantial effect on any company's
safety decisions. To encourage responsible decision-making, our tort
system must therefore articulate fair and predictable recovery stan-
dards with no significant gap in liability. A significant gap currently
exists, however, in corporate liability for exposing people to toxic or
potentially toxic substances through chemical accidents,47 inadequate
occupational health standards, 48 and improper waste disposal. 49
Specifically, current tort law fails to address the particular issues
raised by delayed manifestation5O and causation 51 in toxic tort litiga-
tion.
Although persons exposed to toxic substances may experience
immediate physical symptoms, more often exposure increases one's
risk of contracting a serious disease in the future.52 The disease may
43. Id. at 280. For example, no claims were brought in India regarding an airline crash in
1972, which killed hundreds, or a 1982 incident of liquor contamination, which killed 365. Id. at
280, n.33 (citation omitted).
44. Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law at 25 (cited in note 24).
45. See Marc Galanter, Bhopals Past and Present- The Changing Legal Response to Mass
Disaster, 10 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 151, 154 (1990) (contrasting America's "high
accountability/high remedy" system with India's 'low accountability/low remedy" system, but
noting problems with the American legal system's response to industrial accidents and mass
disasters).
46. Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law at 18 (cited in note 24). Union Carbide illogi-
cally claimed both that the safety of the plants were identical, and that the Bhopal accident
could not have happened in America. Id.
47. See note 71 and accompanying text.
48. See note 70 and accompanying text.
49. See notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
50. See notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
51. See notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
52. Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances at 3 (cited in note 13).
1996] 795
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
remain latent for many years after exposure. 53 When the disease fi-
nally manifests itself, the statute of limitations may have run, the
responsible company may be out of business, or other circumstances
barring suit may have arisen.54 Most importantly, it may be impossi-
ble for a plaintiff to prove that a disease which arose twenty or thirty
years after exposure was in fact caused by that exposure.5  In most
cases, a potential plaintiff had some statistical chance of contracting
the disease before being exposed to the toxic substance.56 The poten-
tial defendant's actions merely increased that risk.
This Note argues that increasing a person's risk of contracting
a serious illness by exposing that person to a toxic substance should
constitute a legally actionable injury. The Note suggests ways in
which increased risk causes of action, including medical monitoring,
fear of future disease, and outright recovery for increased risk, can be
sensibly and effectively defined by state legislatures. Effective draft-
ing will ensure that courts apply these causes of action in ways that
will deter environmentally irresponsible behavior without unfairly
interfering with commercial function and progress. Part II discusses
environmental regulation's failure to prevent human exposure to toxic
substances, and suggests that this failure is primarily due to
difficulties in assessing risks and enforcing the regulations. Part III
examines traditional tort law and current judicial standards
governing increased risk causes of action and highlights the ways in
which these causes of action have failed to fit the realities of toxic tort
litigation. Part IV issues a call for legislative recognition and defi-
nition of increased risk causes of action. To this end, this Part evalu-
ates the Guam Toxic Substance Exposure Compensation Act of 199057
and outlines issues to be addressed in drafting similar legislation in
other jurisdictions. Part V discusses the integration of increased risk
causes of action into existing tort law and balances the costs of such a
system against the costs of the current system. This Note ultimately
concludes that if carefully defined, the benefits of recognized
increased risk causes of action outweigh the risks and costs.
53. Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claims for Damages from Toxic
Exposure without Present Injury, 18 Win. & Mary J. Envir. L. 285, 289-90 (1994).
54. See notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
55. See notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
56. Many factors can cause cancer and other health problems. Cranor, Regulating Toxic
Substances at 3 (cited in note 13). Epidemiologists must therefore compare an expected rate of
a given disease to incidence of the disease after exposure. See generally Black and Lilienfeld, 52
Fordham L. Rev. at 736 (cited in note 22).
57. Guam Code Ann. §§ 41101-07 (1993).
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II. THE FAILURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION TO DETER
BEHAVIOR RESULTING IN HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ToxIc SUBSTANCES
Toxic exposure typically impacts workers,58 users of contami-
nated groundwater,59 and victims of chemical accidents.60 Exposure
may also occur as a result of a person's physical presence in a con-
taminated area.61 OSHA regulates worker exposure in most indus-
tries.62 The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") regulates
groundwater and land contamination through the Clean Water Act,63
the Clean Air Act, 64 the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),65 the Toxic Substances
Control Act ("TSCA")66 and other environmental statutes. These fed-
eral agencies seek to identify and control the risks associated with
toxic substances in American commercial enterprises. 67
Current environmental regulation has failed to deter compa-
nies from polluting the environment.68 Improper disposal of hazard-
ous waste,69 failure to take reasonable safety measures to protect em-
ployees, 70 and an unacceptably high number of chemical spills and
58. See, for example, Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir.
1986) (involving a seaman doused with toxic chemicals on two separate occasions while working
as a tanker man on a barge being loaded with chemicals).
59. See, for example, Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (6th Cir.
1988) (involving plaintiffs' groundwater contaminated with chlorinated hydrocarbons from the
defendant's chemical waste burial site).
60. See notes 24-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Union Carbide incidents).
61. See, for example, In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 835 (3rd
Cir. 1990) (involving claims by plaintiffs who lived near an electric rail car facility claimed
exposure to PCBs that were found in high concentration at the rail yard and in the ambient air
and soil).
62. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590, codified
at 29 U.S.C. 651(b)(3) (1988 ed.).
63. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1988 ed.).
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1988 ed.).
65. Id. §§ 9601 et seq. (1988 ed.).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (1988 ed.).
67. See generally Office of Technology Assessment Task Force, Identifying and Regulating
Carcinogens 1-22 (Lewis, 1988) (responding to a request for examination of federal testing of
chemicals for carcinogenicity and subsequent use by regulatory agencies).
68. See Melissa Moore Thompson, Comment, Enhanced Risk of Disease Claims: Limiting
Recovery to Compensation for Loss, Not Chance, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 453, 453 (1994) (prefacing
discussion of increased risk claims with a catalogue of various toxic exposure fact patterns
which, because of their frequent occurrence, "approach... the realm of archetype").
69. See Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law at 14 (cited in note 24).
70. For example, in 1992, a GE plant in Anaheim, California lost its PCB handling license
because the plant posed an unreasonable risk to human health and the environment.
Coppolino, Sierra Mag. at 43 (cited in note 16). According to testimony in a lawsuit filed by one
of the workers, GE placed workers in direct, continuous contact with PCBs, located the em-
ployee eating lounge in the drum storage room, and failed to give any warning whatsoever about
the substance's know risks. Id.
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transportation accidents persist in the United States and worldwide. 71
In addition, the current system fails to create strong incentives for
companies to generate information about the chemicals they use or
produce. 72 Unlike food and drug regulations, which require companies
to demonstrate affirmatively that a product is safe before marketing
it, environmental regulations allow most toxic substances to be used
or produced unless and until an agency imposes restrictions. 73
Companies therefore have an incentive to ignore information about
the risks associated with a particular substance. 74
Effective regulation requires viable enforcement techniques
and accurate risk assessment. The current regulatory system does
not adequately address either element. Systematic under-enforce-
ment significantly decreases the deterrence value of environmental
regulation. For example, in the case of toxic waste dumping, the re-
sponsible party often cannot be identified, much less punished.75
Typically, violations of environmental regulations result in fines. 76 If
violations are detected, companies can factor fines and penalties into
the cost of doing business. 77 Moreover, as with many crimes, a com-
pany may stand a good chance of avoiding detection altogether. 78
71. See Cassels, The Uncertain promise of Law at 25-28 (cited in note 24) (discussing the
chemical accident rate and describing the high risks associated with the chemical industry).
72. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory
Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 261, 299-300 (1991) (stating that "the
industrial defendant is typically in the best position to create the necessary data, but its incen-
tives are the reverse").
73. CERCLA and RCRA target specific lists of chemicals and empower the EPA to add to
these lists when necessary. Office of Technology Assessment Task Force, Identifying and
Regulating Carcinogens at 15 (cited in note 67). Under TSCA, chemical manufacturers must
submit a "pre-manufacturing notice" to the EPA. Id. at 13-15. See Mary Lyndon, Information
Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 Mich. L. Rev.
1795, 1823-25 (noting that since pre-manufacturing notices often contain no health or safety in-
formation, and since the EPA must show the chemical poses an unreasonable risk to human
health before regulating it, TSCA essentially establishes a presumption of safety). Under the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, however, the EPA can require toxicity
testing of pesticide ingredients before they enter the market. Office of Technological
Assessment Task Force, Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens at 13 (cited in note 67).
74. See note 71 and accompanying text.
75. Kip W. Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance,
Governmental Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 Yale J. Reg. 65, 92
(1989).
76. See generally Keith Meyer, The Environmental Fate of Toxic Waters, the Certainty of
Harm, Toxic Torts and Toxic Regulations, 19 Envir. L. 321, 377-82 (1988).
77. Id. at 379.
78. OSHA guidelines are enforced with rare on-site inspections. Viscusi, 6 Yale J. Reg. at
92 (cited in note 75).
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In a climate devoid of moral consensus, 79 toxic substance regu-
lation will succeed only if companies find that adhering to a regula-
tion is cheaper than violating it. In making this determination, com-
panies will naturally discount the amount of any potential fines by
the probability that they will escape detection. This reduced penalty
cost may prove to be less than the cost of preventing exposure or us-
ing non-toxic substances where possible.
A noted case, Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.,8o pro-
vides an example of such a calculation. Firestone contracted with two
companies to dispose of its industrial waste at a particular landfill.
8
Firestone was aware that California law prohibited the disposal of
toxic substances and liquids at this particular landfill because of the
danger that they could leach into groundwater.8 2 For years, Firestone
nonetheless sent toxic substances to the landfill, because it considered
proper disposal of the wastes to be too costly.8 3 Ultimately, the
groundwater and the domestic well water of nearby residents were
contaminated with a number of strongly suspected carcinogens.8
Firestone's blatant policy of non-compliance suggests that the com-
pany believed it would be cheaper in the long run to violate California
environmental laws than to dispose of its waste properly.85
Systematic under-enforcement of environmental regulations
partly explains the failure of current regulations to deter environmen-
tally irresponsible behavior. The equally vexing problem of agency
risk assessment not only contributes to current failures but also
raises serious doubt about the deterrent value of environmental regu-
lation. Agencies must make both qualitative and quantitative risk
assessments.86 That is, an agency must decide whether a substance
qualitatively poses a risk, and if so, must measure that risk and pos-
sible reactions to it quantitatively.
79. Unlike most crimes, there is not a secure moral and political consensus about the
goals of environmental regulations. Keith Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement: Regulation
and the Social Definition of Pollution 12-13 (Clarendon, 1984).
80. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 863 P.2d 795 (1993).
81. Id. at 801-02.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The chemicals found in the water included benzene, toluene, chloroform, 1,1-di-
chloroethene, methylene chloride, tetrachloroethene, 1,1,1-trichloroethane, trichloroethene and
vinyl chlorine. Id.
85. The court held Firestone liable for medical monitoring costs, and remanded the case
for a determination of whether Firestone had acted with "oppression, fraud or malice," thereby
incurring liability for emotional distress. Id. at 827.
86. Office of Technology Assessment Task Force, Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens
at 7-8 (cited in note 67).
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The EPA considers a substance qualitatively toxic if it causes
harmful effects in animals. 87 Animal testing is itself highly controver-
sial. Even if the process were free from controversy, however, the
vast number of potentially toxic substances would still make qualita-
tive risk assessment a very difficult endeavor.88 The EPA and OSHA
lack the resources to evaluate every chemical used in American indus-
try.8 9 Even if eventually tested, a chemical will likely be in use for a
significant amount of time before it attracts agency attention. 90 In
fact, the chemical might not attract any notice until it causes signifi-
cant harm.91 Even when agencies have identified chemicals associ-
ated with adverse health effects, the agencies may find it difficult to
prioritize. 92 Various agencies may also have conflicting goals and
methods, resulting in confused messages to the public about priorities
and risk.9 3 One agency might even promote an environmental goal by
promulgating rules that directly impinge on the environmental objec-
tives of another agency.94
Once a qualitative evaluation has been made, the agency be-
gins the quantitative aspect of risk assessment. First, the agency
creates a mathematical model of animal response to high dosages of a
substance and extrapolates a human response from this model.95
Next, the agency gathers information about exposure levels and uses
this information to estimate individual risks and to project the num-
ber of harmful effects that a substance will cause in a given popula-
tion.9 6 This is a general determination, which, when applied to a
87. Id. at 7.
88. See Applegate, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 289 (cited in note 72) (noting that a majority of
drugs and chemicals have not been subjected to adequate health testing).
89. Id.
90. See Lyndon, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 1824 (cited in note 73) (explaining the process by
which chemicals become regulated under TSCA). See also John M. indeloff, The Dilemma of
Toxic Substance Regulation: How Overregulation Causes Underregulation at OSHA 261-67
(IT, 1991) (explaining how the restricted flow of information to regulators and the possibility
of court challenges to regulation contribute to OSHA delays); Cranor, Regulating Toxic
Substances at 5 (cited in note 13) (arguing that present research intensive risk assessment poli-
cies contribute to delay).
91. See Ferretti, 10 Pace Envir. L. Rev. at 718-19 (cited in note 10) (showing that envi-
ronmental statutes were reactive at best, passed only after the dangers posed by waste sites,
water pollution, pesticides, and other chemicals were well-documented).
92. Applegate, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 291 (cited in note 72). Agencies, in other words, must
decide where to allocate resources and focus regulatory efforts. Id.
93. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 22 (cited in note 21).
94. For example, the EPA's Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response once discour-
aged the recycling of refrigerators, which contain CFCs, while the EPA's Office of Air and
Radiation encouraged the recycling of refrigerators to save the ozone layer. Id.
95. Office of Technology Assessment Task Force, Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens
at 7-8 (cited in note 67).
96. Id. at 8.
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given situation, may result in either underregulation, which fails to
control risky behavior, or overregulation, which discourages produc-
tive and safe use of industrial chemicals.
These risk assessment difficulties, combined with gaps in en-
forcement, have significantly lessened the deterrent effect of envi-
ronmental regulation. Nor does regulation offer an independently
viable solution to environmentally irresponsible behavior. There are
simply too many chemicals and too many companies using them for
agency regulation to effect complete control. Under-enforcement and
limited evaluation of potentially toxic substances produce a system
that fails to provide adequate incentives for companies to act respon-
sibly.
III. THE FAiLuRE OF CURRENT TORT RECOVERY STANDARDS
Regulation alone, then, cannot adequately deter companies
from engaging in behavior that may expose people to hazardous sub-
stances. Tort liability should work to bolster the deterrent effect of
these regulations. Under existing tort law, however, plaintiffs en-
counter significant barriers to recovery for the kinds of harm caused
by exposure to toxic substances. These barriers severely inhibit the
deterrent function of tort liability.97 Although some jurisdictions have
recognized causes of action that have the potential to mitigate the
unfairness of the traditional response to toxic torts, these causes of
action have been so conservatively defined that they in many ways
perpetuate existing problems. That is, courts have reduced the effi-
cacy of these causes of action by attempting to make them conform to
inapplicable, but familiar, tort standards.
97. In addition to the barriers discussed in Part III.A., difficulties presented by toxic tort
litigation might include managing the size of some plaintiff classes, funding the preliminary in-
vestigations, scientific or otherwise, and meeting the standards for expert opinion in scientific
matters. For a chronicle of the difficulties faced by seven families in Woburn, Massachusetts
during their litigation of claims against W.R. Grace Co. and Beatrice Foods for contaminating
their drinking water with TCE and significantly increasing the rate of leukemia in the town, see
generally Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action (Random House, 1995). The district court judge
required the plaintiffs to obtain a jury verdict that the defendants had actually contaminated
the water before permitting them to proceed to the issue regarding increased risk of contracting
leukemia. After months of trial and hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of expert testimony
and research, the jury found W.R. Grace guilty only of contaminating the water. The plaintiffs
no longer had the resources to litigate the claim, and were forced to settle for a disappointing
amount. Their lawyer, who had devoted his attention exclusively to the case for years, even-
tually had to declare personal bankruptcy. Subsequently, an EPA report proved conclusively
that both defendants had in fact contaminated the water. The plaintiffs had a good case, but
were overwhelmed by the burdens of toxic tort litigation. Id.
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A. Barriers of Traditional Tort Law
In theory, companies that engage in actions causing injury to
others may be held liable in tort. Toxic exposure cases, however, pre-
sent unique difficulties. In this context, injurious behavior may not
result in appropriate liability, or indeed in any liability at all. This is
largely because the plaintiff will be held to traditional tort stan-
dards.98 She must prove that the defendant owed her a duty, that the
defendant breached that duty, that she suffered an injury, and that
the defendant's breach caused her injury.9 9 In toxic exposure cases,
the plaintiff may not be able to prove that she suffered a legally rec-
ognizable injury.100 If she can prove injury, she may not be able to
prove causation. 101 Tort cases of this nature are extremely difficult to
win under traditional principles. This makes the prospect of full tort
liability so unlikely that it does not provide an effective supplement to
environmental regulation.102
The long latency periods of toxic exposure diseases 103 create a
number of barriers to full tort recovery. If a disease does not manifest
itself until ten, twenty, or thirty years after exposure, the statute of
limitations on the plaintiffs claim may well have run, relieving the
defendant of all liability.104 Furthermore, by the time a disease mani-
fests itself, a particular company may have reorganized, 05 gone out of
business, or declared bankruptcy.106 There is no guarantee, for in-
stance, that a paper mill which releases dioxin into a nearby stream
98. See, for example, Potter, 863 P.2d at 816.
99. W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30 (West, 5th ed. 1984)
(describing the elements of a cause of action in negligence).
100. In other words, increased susceptibility to disease or increased likelihood of contract-
ing a disease may not constitute a legally recognizable injury in the same way that manifesting
symptoms would.
101. See notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
102. This gap in tort liability is illustrated by the asbestos situation. Gregory L. Ash,
Comment, Toxic Torts and Latent Diseases: The Case for an Increased Risk Cause of Action, 38
U. Kan. L. Rev. 1087, 1092-93 (1990).
103. Note, Tort Actions for Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation and Environmental
Carcinogenesis, 90 Yale L. J. 840, 853 (1981).
104. See Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Statutes of Limitations for Toxic Tort
Suits, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1683, 1684 (1983).
105. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A
Solution or a Pandora's Box, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 527, 573 (1984) (noting that if the plaintiffs
had a recognized present claim, such as a fear of future disease, they could be included in any
reorganization plans).
106. David S. Pegno, Note, An Analysis of the Enhanced Risk Cause of Action (or How I
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Toxic Waste), 33 Vill. L. Rev. 437, 445 (1988). For example,
the Johns-Manville Corporation filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 1982 to limit the po-
tential liability it faced for asbestos related claims. Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating
Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1121-23 (1983).
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will still be operating twenty-five years later when people who swam
in the stream actually contract cancer.
Even if a plaintiff were able to recover in full for a disease
manifested years after actual exposure, delay itself would undermine
any deterrent effect. 10 7 The people operating a corporation who actu-
ally cause exposure or contamination may not be sufficiently moti-
vated to modify their behavior for the sake of their corporate succes-
sors, who will face liability in future years.
08
Long latency periods also contribute to what is arguably the
most problematic issue in toxic tort litigation-proving causation.
Because diseases associated with toxic substances can typically be
caused by a number of environmental factors,10 9 it is often difficult if
not impossible to prove that a particular corporate activity led directly
to a particular disease.110 In most cases, medical science can establish
no more than varying degrees of probability that a plaintiffs disease
was caused by a certain defendant."' At most, expert testimony may
show through epidemiological statistics that exposure is likely to
cause or has caused increased incidence of a particular disease in a
given group. 12 Legal commentators often refer to this causation diffi-
culty as the "indeterminate plaintiff' problem." 3 The problem is pro-
found: if five people in a given community would develop cancer
under any conditions, but ten will develop cancer if the defendant
contaminates the drinking water, how can an individual plaintiff
prove she has one of the five additional cases caused by the
contamination? Clearly the defendant cannot fairly be held liable for
107. See Ash, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 1101 (cited in note 102) (indicating that "[e]ven if de-
layed manifestation claimants are never barred from suit, they still will suffer from the prob-
lems associated with being forced to sue years after the exposure occurs"). But see Thompson,
72 N.C. L. Rev. at 479 (cited in note 68) (arguing that present recovery should be limited to
emotional distress and medical monitoring and that a subsequent remedy should be allowed
only if the disease manifests itself, i.e. no increased risk claims).
108. Legum, 18 Ga. L. Rev. at 585 (cited in note 4).
109. See Black and Lilienfeld, 52 Fordham L. Rev. at 745 (cited in note 22) (discussing
medical approaches to diseases with multiple possible causes).
110. Defense counsel may attempt to show that the plaintiff voluntarily exposed herself to
other toxic substances, or that such exposure is an unavoidable consequence of daily life. Terry
Christovich Gay and Paige Freeman Rosato, Combating Fear of Future Injury and Medical
Monitoring Claims, 61 Def. Couns. J. 554, 562 (1994). See Pegno, 33 Vill. L. Rev. at 442 (cited
in note 106) (The intervening cause argument may pose particular difficulties for a plaintiff
who smokes or lives in a particularly polluted area").
111. Black and Lilienfeld, 52 Fordham L. Rev. at 745-46 (cited in note 22).
112. Id. at 750. Epidemiology is statistically based, but is intended to provide the means to
draw actual biological inferences related to causation. Id.
113. See, for example, Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 Calif. L. Rev. 881, 903-04 (1982) (arguing that toxic tort cases pre-




all cases of cancer in the community, because it is statistically likely
that it caused only some of them. Equally clearly, the defendant
cannot be absolved of all responsibility, because the defendant caused
five additional cancer cases.
The doctrines and procedures of the traditional tort system fail
to address these particular problems presented by toxic exposure
cases. Tort recovery, then, fails to provide the necessary deterrence
supplement to environmental regulations. If tort law were adjusted
to match the realities of the harm caused by toxic exposure, however,
it could function more effectively in this capacity. Holding a defen-
dant directly liable for the increased risk its behavior inflicts on the
community could accomplish such a result.
B. Current Judicial Standards Governing Causes of Action for
Increased Risk
Three main causes of action have emerged to deal with toxic
tort issues: medical monitoring, 114 fear of future disease,"5 and out-
right recovery for increased risk of disease." 6 These three causes of
action are conceptually distinct and require the plaintiff to meet dif-
ferent standards. 17 All three, however, essentially allow the plaintiff
to recover before it is known whether she will actually suffer a medi-
cal problem as a result of the defendant's conduct. As such, all three
are essentially causes of action for increased risk, though only one is
explicitly framed in these terms. In other words, the existence of in-
creased risk of harm is the underlying theory behind each cause of
action. Depending on individual circumstances, a plaintiff may be
able to recover directly for the injury through the increased risk cause
of action, for the emotional distress suffered as a result of the injury
through the fear of future disease claim, and/or for any medical bills
reasonably incurred as a result of the injury through the medical
114. See Part III.B.1. See generally Susan L. Martin and Jonathan D. Martin, Tort Actions
for Medical Monitoring: Warranted or Wasteful?, 20 Colum. J. Envir. L. 121 (1995).
115. See Part III.B.2. See generally Glen Donath, Curing Cancerphobia Phobia:
Reasonableness Redefined, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (1995).
116. See Part III.B.3. See generally Legum, 18 Ga. L. Rev. at 586-91 (cited in note 4).
117. Usually, medical monitoring claimants must show exposure to a toxic substance and
that medical monitoring would be medically beneficial. See notes 126-28 and accompanying
text. Fear of future disease claimants must show that their fears are reasonable and must
usually show some sort of physical injury or impact. See notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
Increased risk claimants typically must meet the much higher burden of showing that it is more
likely than not that they will contract a given disease. See notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
See also Dworkin, 53 Fordham L. Rev. at 570-71 (cited in note 105) (characterizing medical
monitoring recovery as a "compromise solution" between the extremes of denying all toxic
substance exposure recovery and allowing emotional distress recovery).
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monitoring claims. Each of the three causes of action therefore has
the potential to contribute in a unique way to providing full increased
risk recovery.
The recognition of increased risk causes of action, however, has
not been without significant qualification. Courts typically try to
force these causes of action into the traditional tort paradigm, with
the result that plaintiffs are faced with difficult and often insur-
mountable barriers to recovery. Such barriers result in an inefficient
system of novel theories uncomfortably yoked to traditional tort prin-
ciples. Significantly, courts may continue to conceptualize the under-
lying injury in these causes of action as the actual disease, virtually
guaranteeing that causation will remain a vexing problem. In order
to address the problems raised by toxic tort litigation more effectively,
increased risk must be identified as the underlying injury. The dis-
tinction is subtle but crucial.
1. Recovery for Medical Monitoring
The leading case on medical monitoring recovery is Ayers v.
Jackson Tp.118 In that case, a landfill operated by a township in New
Jersey leached contaminants,19 including four suspected human
carcinogens, 120 into the plaintiffs' drinking water.1 2' At trial, the jury
found that the township had operated the landfill in an unreasonable
manner.122  There was evidence that the township had simply
disregarded the conditions the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection had imposed on its permit to operate the
landfill. 123 The plaintiffs sought, among other damages, recovery for
the costs of medical surveillance to detect any future signs of can-
cer.1 24 The Supreme Court of New Jersey allowed the plaintiffs to re-
cover these costs on the theory that, because they would incur medical
118. 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287 (1987).
119. The contaminants were acetone, benzene, chlorobenzene, chloroform, dichlore-
fluoromethane, ethylbenzene, methylene chloride, methyl isobutyl ketone, 1,1,2,2-tetrachlo-
roethane, tetrahydrofuran, 1,1,1-trichloroethane, and trichoroethylene. Id. at 292.
120. Id.
121. For a discussion of the process by which groundwater becomes contaminated, see
Kevin A. LaValle, Groundwater Contamination: Removal of the Constraints Barring Recovery
for Increased Risk and Fear of Future Diseases, 1988 Detroit College L. Rev. 65, 69-75 (1988).
122. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 292.
123. Id. The conditional permit had limited the depth of waste deposit in an effort to keep
the waste above the level of the groundwater. Id. The court found that the township had
"ignored its duty to control and limit the depth of the trenches in which wastes were deposited."
Id.
124. Id. at 291. The plaintiffs also sought damages for emotional distress and deterioration
of quality of life. Id.
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costs they would not otherwise have incurred, the plaintiffs had suf-
fered presently identifiable injuries. 125
The Ayers court required the plaintiffs to prove medical moni-
toring to be reasonable and necessary based on: (1) the significance
and extent of exposure, (2) the toxicity of the chemical, (3) the seri-
ousness of the disease at stake, (4) the relative increase in risk, and
(5) the value of early diagnosis. 126 Following Ayers, courts have con-
tinued to employ similar factors in assessing medical monitoring
claims. The value of early diagnosis has proved to be of particular
significance. In another important case, In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litigation,27 a federal district court predicted that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court would recognize a medical monitoring claim only if
medical procedures existed which would make it possible to detect
and treat any diseases associated with exposure early. 128
Indeed, medical monitoring liability is appropriate only when
exposure creates risk such that early diagnosis is possible and is
likely to improve the plaintiffs medical condition. That is, medical
monitoring would be a futile response to risk of a disease that is in-
curable at any stage or undetectable until acute. Therefore, even
though medical monitoring is properly defined as a present injury (in
the form of increased cost for presently necessary medical treatment),
it is of limited application. The medical monitoring cause of action is
only appropriate in situations involving detectable and curable dis-
eases.
2. Recovery for Fear of Future Disease
Fear of future disease claims are a species of emotional dis-
tress recovery. 129 Although the fear of future disease claim raises in-
dependent concerns, it is inevitably conditioned by the evolution of the
emotional distress claim generally. Intentional infliction of emotional
distress has long been recognized as an independent cause of action. 130
In contrast, recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress has
125. Id. at 304.
126. Id. at 312. The court specified that these items must be shown through "reliable sci-
entific testimony." Id.
127. 916 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1990) (involving a claim for medical monitoring damages by 38
persons who lived near a rail yard owned by defendant sought medical monitoring damages
after being exposed to PCBs).
128. Id. at 852.
129. See generally Dworkin, 53 Fordham L. Rev. at 570 (cited in note 105) (tracing the ori-
gins of the fear of future disease claims). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 436, 436A
(1965) (summarizing the elements of emotional distress).
130. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 306 (cited in note 129).
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traditionally been allowed only in conjunction with independent
physical injury.131 Some modern courts, however, have recognized an
independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress in limited circumstances. 132 These courts seek to articulate a
fair standard that allows legitimately injured plaintiffs to recover,
without opening the floodgates to a sea of phony or de minimis
claims. 1
33
To this end, courts have generally required the plaintiff to
demonstrate a physical nexus with the defendant's conduct. 34 That
is, the plaintiff must usually show either that she was physically im-
pacted by the defendant's conduct or that she suffered a physical
manifestation of the emotional distress. 135 In the absence of physical
impact or manifestation, a negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim is typically considered too speculative. 136
Some courts, however, have interpreted the physical impact
requirement expansively. 37 For instance, courts have held that sub-
cellular contact with a toxic substance constitutes a physical im-
pact.138 Some courts have similarly relaxed the physical manifestation
requirement. In Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.,139 for
example, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the physical
manifestation requirement was satisfied by the fact that the plaintiffs
had been sufficiently worried about toxic exposure to consult a
doctor.40 In the toxic exposure context, courts that have relaxed the
physical impact and manifestation requirements implicitly recognize
that such requirements are ill-suited to the specific area of toxic
exposure. Continuous low-level toxic exposure rarely leads to
immediately identifiable effects.'41 Often the plaintiff will not be able
131. Dworkin, 53 Fordham L. Rev. at 545 (cited in note 105).
132. Id. at 531.
133. See id. at 553 (noting that this concern becomes more compelling as the time period
between impact and emotional injury increases).
134. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436 (cited in note 129).
135. Id.
136. See Dworkin, 53 Fordham L. Rev. at 529 (cited in note 105) (stating that courts tradi-
tionally have viewed emotional distress claims with suspicion, since they are highly subjective
and carry no meaningful market value).
137. See Scott D. Marrs, Mind over Body: Trends Regarding the Physical Injury
Requirement in Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and "Fear of Disease" Cases, 28 Tort &
Ins. L. J. 1 (1992) (describing the current state of the law in each state regarding the physical
impact/physical manifestation rule).
138. See, for example, Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
139. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
140. Id. at 434.
141. See Black and Lilienfeld, 52 Fordham L. Rev. at 744-49 (cited in note 22) (discussing
the general course of toxic exposure).
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to point to a bruise, broken bone, or injury to a particular organ. And
yet, surely someone who has been exposed to a known toxic substance
is justified in being distressed, even without a bruise or a broken
bone. 42 Moreover, the physical manifestation requirement can lead to
arbitrary and seemingly inconsistent results.'14 The physical
manifestation standard essentially rewards people who exhibit
adverse physical reactions to stress and penalizes people who
internalize stress well.
If increased risk were explicitly recognized as the injury under-
lying the fear of future disease claims, many of these inconsistencies
could be reduced. In Potter,14 the Supreme Court of California made
an important move in this direction. In assessing whether or not the
plaintiffs' fears of contracting cancer were reasonable, the Potter court
looked not to the existence of a physical injury or manifestation, but
to the probability that the plaintiffs would actually contract cancer. 4 5
The court, however, required the plaintiffs to show that the cancer
was more likely than not to occur, an extremely difficult standard.146
The court noted that a twenty or thirty percent risk of cancer would
probably also cause genuine emotional distress, 147 but limited the
plaintiffs' ability to recover for "public policy" reasons. 4
Although the Potter court set a difficult, if not impossible,
standard, its willingness to examine the actual nature of the injury in
determining the validity of an emotional distress claim represents an
improvement in the legal response to toxic torts. From a common
sense perspective, it is more reasonable to tie a plaintiffs emotional
distress recovery to the amount of risk she faces than to whether or
not the toxic chemical also caused a migraine headache or insomnia.4 9
The Potter approach should be further refined for application to toxic
142. Courts sometimes recognize the reasonableness of a plaintiffs fear, but still decline to
allow recovery. The Potter court, for example, indicated:
[We would be very hard pressed to find, as a matter of law, a plaintiff with a 20 percent
or 30 percent chance of developing cancer cannot genuinely, seriously and reasonably
fear the prospect of cancer. Nonetheless, we conclude, for the public policy reasons
identified below, that emotional distress caused by the fear of a cancer that is not prob-
able should generally not be compensable in a negligence action.
863 P.2d at 811.
143. See Donath, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1120-25 (cited in note 115) (arguing that both the
physical injury and physical manifestation standards lead to arbitrary and confused awards).
144. For a summary of the facts in Potter, see notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
145. Potter, 863 P.2d at 810-11.
146. Id. at 817.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 816.
149. The focus on risk of disease also allays the concern that plaintiffs will exaggerate or
make up symptoms such as migraine headaches and insomnia. Id. at 811.
[Vol. 49:789808
INCREASED RISK
tort litigation. Specifically, the validity of fear of future disease
claims should be correlated to the actual increased risk of contracting
a disease. The arbitrary fifty percent likelihood standard should not
be employed. Rather, the question of whether the plaintiffs showing
of increased risk is significant enough to warrant emotional distress
recovery should be determined by the jury.
3. Outright Recovery for Increased Risk
Conceptually distinct from the fear of future disease claim,150
increased risk recovery is predicated on the idea that the defendant
has inflicted a personal injury on the plaintiff by increasing her
chances of contracting a disease.151 Increased risk is the most difficult
claim on which to succeed, because courts apply traditional causation
principles. These principles require a satisfactory showing that the
actions of defendant X caused plaintiff Y to contract disease Z. Courts
therefore require a plaintiff to show a greater than fifty percent like-
lihood of contracting the disease in question.5 2 Some courts also re-
quire evidence showing that the plaintiff likely falls within the per-
centage that will contract the disease.153
A plaintiff rarely sustains the burden of showing it is more
likely than not that she will contract a disease.14 In Gideon v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 15 the Fifth Circuit allowed recovery for in-
creased risk, but the plaintiff already suffered from an advanced case
of asbestosis, and his doctor testified that "he will die of asbestos
disease, there's no doubt about it."156 This case is not typical. More
often, doctors and epidemiologists are able to testify only that the
150. Fear of future disease claims are based on the idea that exposure to a toxic substance
is an event sufficient in and of itself to give rise to reasonable fear and anxiety. The amount of
increased risk is relevant only insofar as it speaks to the reasonableness of the fear. Increased
risk recovery, on the other hand, is predicated on the idea that increased risk is itself a defin-
able injury. The amount of increased risk is therefore directly linked to the plaintiffs ability to
recover, as well as to the amount of that recovery.
151. Legum, 18 Ga. L. Rev. at 589 (cited in note 4). Scholars have argued that this concep-
tualization is appropriate for situations in which risk of contracting a disease remains after the
risk-creating activity has ceased. Id. at 564. See also note 4 and accompanying text.
152. See, for example, Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319.
153. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Torts: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 857-58 (1984).
154. See, for example, Hagerty, 788 F.2d at 319 (involving a seaman who had been soaked
with toxic chemicals and suffered a number of immediate physical symptoms, but failed to
recover for increased risk).




plaintiff is at risk, not that the disease will more likely than not oc-
cur. 157
The "more probable than not" standard is rather arbitrary: Is
a plaintiff with a forty percent chance of contracting cancer so much
better off than a plaintiff with a fifty-one percent chance of contract-
ing cancer? Why should the latter receive full compensation, while
the former receives nothing? In addition, the more probable than not
standard is not scientifically sound. 58 Risks may be considered sig-
nificant and unacceptable well below a fifty percent threshold. 159
Furthermore, a greater than fifty percent chance of contracting a dis-
ease is often difficult or impossible to prove. 160  Finally, the more
probable than not standard fails to eliminate overcompensation. 61
Indeed, it allows plaintiffs to recover for injuries they may never ac-
tually sustain. After all, a person with a fifty-one percent chance of
contracting cancer also has a forty-nine percent chance of never con-
tracting cancer.
The more probable than not standard reflects judicial unwill-
ingness to accept increased risk itself as a compensable injury.
Courts still focus on the disease as the underlying injury, and try to
establish causation by tying the disease to the plaintiff with a greater
than fifty percent probability. If the injury is reconceptualized as the
creation of risk, however, the analysis changes. The causation issues
becomes much more straightforward: "but for" the defendant's
conduct, would the plaintiff be at an increased level of risk of
contracting a disease? In other words, the probability of disease
becomes the underlying fact to be established. This
reconceptualization would greatly improve the ability of the tort
system to deal with toxic substance exposure issues.
IV. IMPLEMENTING INCREASED RISK CAUSES OF ACTION
Theoretical alternatives for dealing with the problems posed by
toxic substance exposure include social insurance, no fault compensa-
157. See Black and Lilienfeld, 52 Fordham L. Rev. at 745-77 (cited in note 22) (pointing out
that doctors look for the "most likely cause," while the legal system requires them to testify as to
whether a particular factor is "more likely than nof' the cause and that this indicates that
courts have not succeeded in "mesh[ing] law and epidemiology in a consistent way").
158. Ferretti, 10 Pace Envir. L. Rev. at 734 (cited in note 10).
159. Id.
160. See notes 107-11 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of proving
causation).
161. See Part V.B.
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tion schemes, and ad hoc judicial management of catastrophic
events.1 62 Any of these alternatives is likely to provide adequate com-
pensation to victims. 6 3 None of them, however, is effective in
preventing catastrophes from occurring in the first place. They sim-
ply do not provide the proper incentives for companies to modify be-
havior, invest in safety measures, or investigate the toxicity of indus-
trial chemicals.
One commentator, recognizing the need for deterrence, has
proposed a "toxic death risk index tax."164 Industries would pay a tax
based on the number of people likely to be killed or injured in the case
of a toxic accident.65 The central virtue of such a system would be the
imposition of liability "based upon the actual risk created by a pol-
luter,"'166 providing an economic incentive for users and producers of
toxic substances to emphasize safety.' 67
Such an incentive could be imposed less radically through a
system of increased risk liability. 68 One way to implement such a
system effectively is through legislative mandates at the state level.
If properly drafted, such mandates can help courts address and re-
solve the complexities of toxic tort litigation in a uniform and clear
manner. One United States jurisdiction has in fact enacted such a
law, which can serve as a starting point for drafting future state legis-
lation. In 1990, the Guam legislature passed the Toxic Substance
Exposure Compensation Act ("the Guam statute")69 which attempts
to address some of the more vexing issues connected with toxic sub-
stance exposure by recognizing a variety of causes of action for in-
creased risk. '
162. See Robert L. Rabin, Environmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. Rev.
27, 44.45 (1987) (discussing alternative strategies for addressing the legal issues raised by envi-
ronmental harm).
163. No fault systems have an advantage in this regard. Id. at 43.
164. Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: 'Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risk Index
Taxes, 53 Ohio State L. J. 761, 762, 797-802 (1992). This idea derives from other environmental
entitlement theories that require companies to pay in proportion to the harm they create,
thereby creating economic incentives for companies to do less harm.
165. Id. at 765.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. The possibility of a company declaring bankruptcy in the face of liability constitutes a
major reason the tort system cannot cope with mass tort claims effectively. Id. at 764. A cause
of action for increasing risks would mitigate this concern. See notes 107-08 and accompanying
text.
169. Guam Code Ann. §§ 41101-07 (1993).
170. Id. §41104(2). This section of the code specifies that:
Recoverable damages shall include injury, increased risk of illness or injury, lost income,
medical expenses, pain and suffering, emotional distress (attributed to the exposure),
loss of ability to enjoy life, loss of consortium, loss of ability to procreate, medical
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A. The Guam Toxic Substance Exposure Compensation Act
Legislative findings indicate that the Guam statute was in-
tended to alleviate the burdens that toxic tort plaintiffs face in other
jurisdictions. 17' To address the problems associated with the typical
delay between exposure and manifestation or discovery of the
exposure, the statute requires an action to be brought within four
years of exposure or two years of the date of discovery of the harm
caused by the exposure, whichever is later.172 The statute also
addresses the problem of risk assessment by specifying four chemicals
as toxic substances covered by the act.173 The statute, in other words,
engages in legislative risk assessment.
Under the Guam statute, the plaintiff must show exposure
above federally permitted levels to one or more of the listed toxic
substances. 174 If the defendant manufactures the substance, or uses
the substance in the manufacture of another product, it is strictly li-
able.175 If the defendant is someone who controls the substance apart
from manufacture, the plaintiff must also show negligence. 17 6 Once
these requirements have been met, the burden shifts to the defendant
to disprove increased likelihood of disease. 77 Punitive damages are
recoverable if the defendant has concealed the harmful effects of a
toxic substance or has acted with "reckless indifference" to human
health.178
B. Weaknesses of the Guam Statute
Although extremely plaintiff-friendly, the present structure of
the Guam statute is unlikely to have a significant impact on toxic tort
litigation. Indeed, the Guam statute contains a number of weak-
expenses for treatment or monitoring and any other direct or indirect effects of
exposure.
Id.
171. Id. § 41101(7) (indicating that "case law in other jurisdictions has created an
unacceptable burden on persons exposed to toxic substances to prove causation and the
likelihood of harm").
172. Id. § 41104(6).
173. Id. § 41103(1) (stating that "[tioxic substances shall mean polychlorinated biphenyls,
dioxins, furans or halogenated chloroflourocarbons").
174. Id. § 41104(1). Federally permitted levels of exposure are the maximum levels of
exposure of humans as determined by federal regulatory agencies. In the case of conflicting
levels, the lowest maximum permissible level applies. Id. § 41103(3).
175. Id. § 41104(1)(a).
176. Id. § 41104(1)(b).
177. Id. § 41104(5)(a).
178. Id. § 41104(3).
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nesses that should be addressed before similar legislation is adopted
in other jurisdictions. In the only reported case on point since the
adoption of the statute, workers exposed to PCBs after the rupture of
an electrical transformer on the United States Naval Base failed to
recovery79  The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had not
submitted adequate expert testimony on the exposure level of each
individual.' 80 The court, in other words, required the plaintiffs to es-
tablish exposure not only qualitatively, but quantitatively as well.
Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiffs had not established an
increased risk claim since they had not shown that future disease was
more likely than not to occur.18' Clearly the statute's attempt to ad-
dress the problems faced by toxic tort litigants proved unsuccessful in
this instance.
The statute fails to accomplish its purpose largely because it
fails to define the causes of action in sufficient detail. The statute
states that damages for increased risk are recoverable,82 but gives no
further guidance. Similarly, the statute does not address the impor-
tant issue of what evidence can be offered to prove essential elements
like exposure. Moreover, the statute offers no real guidance on calcu-
lating damages. Perhaps most importantly, however, the statute does
not qualitatively supplement environmental regulation. By confining
the statute to four regulated substances, and by keying exposure to
"federally permitted levels," the statute merely amounts to more regu-
lation. It does not exploit its potential to factor something new into
the equation. State legislatures addressing increased risk causes of
action in the future should consider these issues carefully. The
following discussion outlines some suggestions and proposals for
drafting a toxic substance exposure act.
C. Suggestions for Future Statutory Drafting
The ideal statute would alleviate the unfair burdens currently
placed on toxic tort litigants,18 3 but would also ensure that liability is
imposed in a fair, controlled, and productive manner. Such a statute
would compensate injured plaintiffs, but would not unduly interfere
with progress, commercial function, and product innovation. This
balance can be achieved by recognizing increased risk as a compensa-
179. Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1993).
180. Id. at 332, 335.
181. Id. at 334.
182. See note 170 and accompanying text.
183. See Part III.A.
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ble injury in and of itself, but requiring the plaintiff to adhere to tra-
ditional tort principles to recover for that injury. In other words, the
plaintiff should still be required to prove that the defendant owed her
a duty of care, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the
breach caused her increased risk of disease. The plaintiff should also
bear the traditional burden of establishing her case by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
1. Establishing the Existence of an Injury
The plaintiff should initially be required to show two things:
the qualitative toxicity of the substance at issue and exposure to that
substance. These elements suffice to establish the existence of an
injury. The statute should carefully specify the type of evidence to be
utilized and the standards to be used for evaluating that evidence.
184
Showing that a substance has been classified as toxic by a federal
agency should be considered relevant. 185 Because agencies do not have
the resources to identify every potentially toxic substance, however,
the plaintiff should have other evidentiary options as well. For in-
stance, the statute should allow the plaintiff to establish qualitative
toxicity by evidence of harmful effects on animals.18 6 Alternatively,
the plaintiff should be able to show that the substance has a chemical
structure which sufficiently resembles that of a chemical known to
have toxic properties.8 7 The defendant should naturally be able to
introduce evidence of non-toxicity and the plaintiff should bear the
184. The use of scientific evidence in the courtroom is inevitably plagued by controversy.
See, for example, Peter Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom (Basic Books,
1991).
185. In the face of uncertainty, agencies often make conservative decisions. Howard Latin,
Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 Yale J. Reg. 89, 94 (1988). For
example, benign animal tumors are included with malignant ones in risk estimates. Id. at 100.
See also Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances at 221 (cited in note 13) (providing a table of the
most significant scientific uncertainties in carcinogen risk assessments). This policy has been
criticized for being inefficient and inconsistently applied. See Applegate, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at
265 (cited in note 72) ("[The regulatory effect of uncertainty is... inefficiency"); Latin, 5 Yale J.
Reg. at 89-95 (arguing that the EPA's policy of accepting the most conservative scientifically
valid estimate is inconsistently applied and suggesting that the EPA move toward considering
social policy when assessing risks).
186. See Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances at 13-25 (cited in note 13) (describing the
advantages, shortcomings, and process of animal testing).
187. See Lyndon, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 1804-05 (cited in note 73) (explaining how toxicity
might be determined if manufacturers fail to include health effects data when registering
chemicals under TSCA, but noting that this method can be questioned, since a small difference
in chemical structure might make a huge difference in chemical properties).
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burden of persuading a jury that it is more likely than not that the
substance is toxic.188
The plaintiff should also bear the burden of persuading a jury
that more likely than not she was exposed to the substance. The
statute should acknowledge the relevance of a variety of evidence in
proving exposure. Blood tests may be able to measure the amount, if
any, of the chemical absorbed by the plaintiffs system.189 In some
cases, exposure to a toxic substance might cause minor physical
symptoms which can be used as evidence. 190 In any event, the plain-
tiffs own testimony should be considered highly relevant in proving
exposure.1 91 For example, the plaintiff may be able to testify as to how
extensively she used household water later proved to be contami-
nated. Similarly, a plaintiff in an occupational setting may be able to
testify that she remembers using a substance on a regular basis or
that she was never furnished safety gear. The defendant would have
the opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff, and the jury would de-
cide whether the evidence of exposure was credible.
2. Establishing Breach of a Duty of Care
The statute should also require the plaintiff to establish negli-
gence. Violations of federal or state environmental regulations should
be considered highly probative of negligence.192 The negligence in-
quiry should focus partly on the feasibility of alternatives or non-use
of toxic substances. The plaintiff should be required to show, in other
188. In tort litigation, the plaintiff usually must persuade the jury that the existence of a
contested fact is more probable than its non-existence. John William Strong, ed., McCormick on
Evidence § 339 (West, 4th ed. 1992). See Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances at 71-81 (cited in
note 13) (arguing that legal burdens of proof and persuasion represent normative choices about
acceptable risks of error, that science takes a more rigid approach, and that since science and
law serve different institutional functions, legal burdens should be analytically separated from
scientific ones).
189. See, for example, Laxton, 639 S.W.2d at 433 (involving blood tests performed on
plaintiffs showed no abnormalities).
190. For example, exposure to chlorine or chlorinated substances might result in a skin
condition known as chloracne. J.E. Schmidt, Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine C-163 (Matthew
Bender, 1995).
191. The Abuan court discounted the value of the plaintiffs testimony regarding exposure
levels. 3 F.3d at 333 n.4.
192. The Guam statute provides that violation of a federal environmental regulation is
negligence per se. Guam Code Ann. § 41104(b)(i). This raises the same issues as whether
agency determinations of carcinogenicity should suffice to establish qualitative toxicity. See
note 185 and accompanying text. Establishing violation of a statute as negligence per se adds
an additional layer of deterrence to the regulations. On the other hand, keying tort recovery too
closely to existing regulation discounts the tort system's ability to weigh competing policy values




words, that it was possible for the defendant to dispose of waste prop-
erly, to use a non-toxic substance, to set more appropriate occupa-
tional safety standards, or otherwise to take steps to prevent human
exposure to toxic substances. Furthermore, the statute should define
negligence to include failure to take reasonable steps to investigate
the potential toxicity of a particular substance.
3. Defining the Underlying Causes of Action and
Determining Damages
The statute should detail the standards to be employed for
each underlying cause of action. To recover for medical monitoring,
the plaintiff should also be required to show that medical care is
likely to be beneficial. 193 To recover for fear of future disease, the
plaintiff should be required to show that her fear is reasonable vis-a-
vis the magnitude of the increased risk.19 The statute should explic-
itly prohibit the arbitrary fifty-one percent standard. No additional
requirements should be necessary to establish the increased risk
claim itself.195
The ideal statute would establish coherent guidelines for as-
sessing damages. As in the Guam statute, punitive damages should
be recoverable in particularly egregious cases. 196 Medical monitoring
damages should be determined by the cost of the necessary or desir-
able testing. Emotional distress damages should be keyed to the
amount of risk faced by the plaintiff.197 A legislature might also wish
to specify that the notoriousness of a particular substance, or degree
of public apprehension surrounding it, may also constitute a factor in
calculating emotional distress damages.
Increased risk recoveries should be subject to more mathe-
matical computation. The statute should require epidemiological
evidence to quantify the increased risk faced by the plaintiff. Ideally,
total class recovery would equal the present value of the amount the
defendant would have to pay if held liable for all the cases of disease
caused by its conduct. s98 The statute should urge courts to strive for
193. See notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
194. See notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
195. The increased risk is the underlying injury that has already been proven. See Part
III.B.3.
196. Guam Code Ann. § 41104(3) (1993).
197. See Part III.B.2.
198. See Rosenberg, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 881-87 (cited in note 153) (arguing for imposing li-
ability in proportion to the excess disease risk in a population and distributing it among mem-
bers of the class of exposed persons). See also Daniel Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 Minn. L. Rev.
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actuarial accuracy, so that each plaintiffs recovery equals the amount
it would take to insure that plaintiff against the increased risk she
faces.
Under the proposed statute, the plaintiff still faces a number
of significant burdens in proving her case. She has simply been re-
lieved of the impossible burden of proving causation as she must do
when the disease itself, and not the increased risk of contracting the
disease, is posited as the underlying injury. This change of focus
should allay concerns that recognizing increased risk causes of action
would result in counterproductive liability and inhibit commercial
function.
V. IMPLEMENTING AND EVALUATING THE NEW SYSTEM
A. The Similarity Between Increased Risk Causes of Action and Other
Instances in Which Courts Have Modified Traditional
Causation Principles
Although in some respects a radical break with existing tort
doctrine, modifying causation principles in toxic tort cases is not en-
tirely unprecedented. In "wrongful life" cases,199 for instance, some
courts impose liability even though a plaintiff cannot prove that the
defendant's negligent conduct resulted in a legally recognizable in-
jury. For instance, in Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo,200 a doctor negli-
gently failed to diagnose german measles in a pregnant woman. She
subsequently gave birth to a child with congenital rubella syn-
drome. 20 1 Because the doctor could not have done anything to prevent
the harm suffered by the fetus had he diagnosed the woman correctly,
his negligence technically did not cause the injury.2 2 At most, his
negligence caused the woman not to terminate the pregnancy, but the
law traditionally does not recognize the birth of any child as an injury
1219 (1987) (arguing that proportional recovery should be modified to subdivide plaintiffs into
groups according to characteristics that might make contracting the disease more or less likely).
199. See, for example, Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986) (regarding a doctor negli-
gently failing to test a mother for rubella and a child being born with congenital rubella
syndrome); and Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980) (pertaining to a
laboratory negligently performing genetic tests to see if a couple's offspring were likely to be
afflicted with Tay-Sachs and a child who was subsequently born with the disease).
200. 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984).
201. Id. at 758.
202. Id. at 760.
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in and of itself.203 Nevertheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
quired the doctor to pay the child's extraordinary medical expenses. 04
The court based its holding on both fairness and the need to deter fu-
ture wrongful acts.0 5
The DES litigation also presented difficult causation issues.
For example, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,20 6 the injured plaintiff
was faced with the virtually impossible task of identifying which one
of a number of DES manufacturers provided DES to her. Rather than
allow the drug manufacturers to escape liability for the harm they
had imposed upon society, the court held them liable for the harm
caused in proportion to the economic benefit they had received from
the industry as a whole.207 Unlike the typical toxic exposure case,
DES cases like Sindell posed an indeterminate defendant problem.208
The indeterminate defendant problem is nonetheless conceptually
similar to the indeterminate plaintiff problem.2 09 Both involve statis-
tical evidence that the defendant's behavior posed a public health
threat, but in both cases, the plaintiff cannot prove a causal connec-
tion because of the nature of the injury.210 In toxic exposure cases,
courts should similarly hold defendants who gain an economic benefit
from a particular activity liable for the health costs of that activity.
"Loss of a chance" cases are also analytically similar to in-
creased risk causes of action.21' For example, in Herskovits v. Group
Health Co-op. of Puget Sound,212 a doctor negligently failed to
diagnose a patient's lung cancer.213 The patient would have had only a
thirty-nine percent chance of surviving the cancer even if timely
diagnosis had been made.214 With the delay, however, his chances
were decreased to twenty-five percent.2 5 Traditional tort doctrine
dictated that since the patient had less than a fifty percent chance of
203. Id. at 761.
204. Id. at 764.
205. Id. at 763.
206. 163 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132, 607 P.2d 924 (1980).
207. Id. at 929. The Sindell court cited Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), for the
proposition that "as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should
bear the costs of the injury." Id. at 936.
208. See Delgado, 70 Calif. L. Rev. at 883 (cited in note 113) (distinguishing the DES
"indeterminate defendant' problem from the toxic tort indeterminate plaintiff problem).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See generally Howard Ross Feldman, Chances as Protected Interests: Recovery for the
Loss of a Chance and Increased Risk, 17 U. Balt. L. Rev. 139 (1987).
212. 99 Wash. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
213. Id. at 475-76.




survival from the start, he suffered no compensable injury due to the
doctor's negligence. 21 6 That is, because the patient had a less than
fifty percent chance of survival to begin with, the doctor's negligent
diagnosis was not a substantial factor in bringing about his death.217
The Herskovits court, however, permitted the patient to re-
cover on the theory that the fourteen percent lost chance of survival
constituted a substantial factor in bringing about his injury.218 The
concurring judge was willing to go even farther by explicitly recogniz-
ing the lost fourteen percent chance as the underlying injury.219
Increased risk cases raise similar concerns.
Should courts continue to adhere to traditional causation prin-
ciples that deny recovery to legitimately injured plaintiffs? Should
they simply set a lower threshold for proving causation, as the
Herskovits court did when it held that a fourteen percent reduction in
chance of survival constituted a substantial factor in bringing about
death? Or should courts explicitly acknowledge the statistical nature
of the underlying injury and compensate for the statistical injury di-
rectly?
As the concurrence in Herskovits demonstrated, the latter
course is the most desirable. In fact, conceptualizing the underlying
injury as a statistical increase in risk simply allows courts to apply
traditional tort principles to a new type of injury. No radical reformu-
lation of causation thresholds is necessary.
B. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of the New System
Undeniably, implementing a system of increased risk recovery
would carry potential costs. Most of these costs, however, could be
contained by sensible legislative drafting and judicial application.
Moreover, on balance, the costs of the new system are outweighed by
its deterrence and information-forcing benefits.
Ideally plaintiffs would be compensated in proportion to the
amount of increased risk actually incurred. This compensation
scheme thus technically avoids the problem of overcompensation.
Nevertheless, a plaintiff who admittedly may not ever suffer any ad-
verse medical effects from toxic exposure could receive compensation
under the statute. This concern, however, should not defeat the en-
tire concept of increased risk recovery. Potential overcompensation
216. Id. at 476.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 479.
219. Id. at 487.
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should be weighed against the value of these causes of action in
deterring socially harmful behaviors.
In certain contexts, Congress has determined that overcom-
pensating plaintiffs is justified if it achieves socially desirable results.
For example, Congress has allowed plaintiffs to receive treble dam-
ages under the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO").220 This heightened damage provision
creates a private incentive to bring suit against a person who has vio-
lated racketeering laws. The effect is to add an additional layer of
deterrence: the defendant incurs liability under both governmental
regulations and private tort laws.
The civil provisions of RICO and similar statutes221 essentially
designate the plaintiff as a private attorney general 2 2 whose private
legal action ultimately benefits the public. By analogy, if regulation
has failed to deter environmentally irresponsible behavior, a person
who has incurred a statistical increase in the likelihood that she will
contract a disease should be allowed to sue. This plaintiff would func-
tion as a private attorney general in that her cause of action would
ultimately achieve the socially desirable result of forcing a company to
pay the costs of environmentally harmful activity.223 A primary goal
of tort law,224 deterrence, argues strongly in favor of increased risk
causes of action. Thus, even if one were to view the increased risk
recovery as potentially overcompensating plaintiffs, it does not follow
that such recovery should not be allowed.
Private tort litigation also has a number of institutional ad-
vantages that render it a helpful supplement to regulatory action.
First, agencies specialize in detection and investigation, while private
parties have more expertise in litigation tactics. 225 Private litigators
may also be more efficient because of their ability to organize a claim
outside of a rigidly bureaucratic structure.226 Furthermore, private
220. 18 USC § 1964(c) (1994 ed.).
221. For examples of federal statutes creating a "private attorney general," see Consumer
Product Safety Act § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1994 ed.); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000(a)(3)(b), 2000(e)(5)(k) (1988 ed. & Supp. V); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994 ed.);
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(e) (1994 ed.).
222. The term "private attorney generar' was coined by Judge Jerome Frank of the Second
Circuit in Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2nd Cir.
1943), to refer to a private plaintiff whose claim worked to "vindicate the public interest." Id.
223. Thus it is best to recognize increased risk causes of action by legislative mandate. See
Part IV.
224. Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray, The Law of Torts § 11.5
(Little, Brown, 2nd ed. 1986).
225. John C. Coffee, Rescuing th Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 Mary. L. Rev. 215, 224 (1983).
226. Id. at 226.
820 [Vol. 49:789
INCREASED RISK
litigation may ultimately result in fairer outcomes in that the parties
will theoretically be evenly matched, whereas agencies can exploit the
power and ideological force of government status.227
Recognizing increased risk causes of action would provide the
additional benefit of generating more information about potentially
toxic substances. The connection between exposure and disease
would be subject to increased judicial and commercial scrutiny. In
other words, the mere process of litigating these claims would prob-
ably yield new information. For example, recognizing medical moni-
toring claims brought by a group of plaintiffs who could prove expo-
sure to a particular substance would result in a collection of helpful
data for an epidemiologist to use in studying the effects of the sub-
stance.228
Furthermore, recognizing an increased risk cause of action
would give companies using and producing toxic substances an incen-
tive to generate information about the substance, 229 the risk of
disease, 230 and ways to prevent exposure in the first place. If liability
hinges on an accurate assessment of risks associated with a particular
substance, a company would surely want to learn all it could, good or
bad, about that substance before using or producing it. In the end, in-
creased information would benefit everybody-the company, the gov-
ernment, and the public. The company would make better informed
risk management decisions. The government's difficult risk assess-
ment burden would be alleviated. Most importantly, the public would
receive more accurate information about the risks it faces from toxic
substances. William Ruckelshaus, former director of the EPA, has
observed that when people receive more information about various
risks, they are more likely to accept them.231 When asked to rate vari-
ous risk factors in society, the public currently tends to rank them in
227. Id. at 227.
228. See generally Norman J. Landau and Douglas K.W. Landau, Claims for Nonphysical
and Nonpresent Injuries: Emotional Distress and Medical Monitoring Damages, in G. Marc
Whitehead, ed., Preparation and Trial of a Toxic Tort Case, 1990 at 327 (Practicing Law
Institute and Administrative Practice Series no. 388).
229. Commentators have previously identified a need to shift the burden of generating in-
formation about toxic substances onto those who use and produce them. See, for example
Kathleen O'Nan, The Challenge of Latent Physical Effects of Toxic Substances: The Next Step in
the Evolution of Toxic Torts, 7 J. Min. L. & Policy 227 (1991-92) (arguing that if a plaintiff can
establish prima facie evidence of toxic exposure, defendants should bear the costs of the
scientific testing required for litigation).
230. Office of Technology Assessment, Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens 63 (cited in
note 67).
231. William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 Envir. L. Rep. 10190, 10192
(stating that "better information inclines people to act more sensibly").
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a significantly different order than environmental experts.23 2
Increased information about toxic substances should narrow the gap
between the public's risk perceptions and scientific knowledge.
VI. CONCLUSION
A large number of potentially toxic substances are currently in
industrial use.233 The federal government must pursue regulatory
strategies that require companies to use due care regarding these
substances. Due to the inherent limitations on environmental regula-
tion, however, state legislatures and courts must also implement a
system of tort recovery designed to supplement regulatory efforts.
These regulatory and compensatory devices must make it worthwhile
for a company to make responsible environmental decisions. Perhaps
more importantly, however, legislatures and courts must implement a
system that forces companies to research and evaluate the potential
health effects of new chemicals working their way into the industrial
world. Similarly, they must ensure that new technologies are imple-
mented in a safe manner. Before the dire health effects of DDT were
recognized, the substance was sprayed indiscriminately on crop fields,
with disastrous consequences. 234 Surely no one wishes to repeat this
scenario with a new chemical or a biotechnological agent.235
To achieve these goals, state legislatures should recognize in-
creased risk causes of action-medical monitoring, fear of future dis-
ease, and outright recovery for increased risk. Legislatures should
define the standards of recovery and evidentiary burdens carefully, so
as to achieve a balance between addressing the toxic tort problem and
232. Risk perception factors include whether the risk is incurred voluntarily or involuntar-
ily, whether the risk affects everyone or only a small, identifiable group, the way the existence
of the risk is communicated to the public, and, above all, the degree of uncertainty associated
with the risk. Id.
233. According to a report issued by the National Research Council of the National
Academy of Sciences, in 1984 no toxicity data were available for approximately 80% of these
substances. National Research Council, Toxicity Testing: Strategies to Determine Needs and
Priorities (1984). Although a number of these chemicals probably pose no threat, a significant
number may.
234. See generally Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin, 1962) (attempting to
bring the harmful effects of chemical pesticides on the environment and human health to the
attention of the public).
235. See Ferretti, 10 Pace Envir. L. Rev. at 748 (cited in note 10).
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promoting commercial progress. Careful drafting will help courts im-
plement increased risk recovery in a fair, uniform, and sensible man-
ner.
Tamsen Douglass Love

